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ABSTRACT
In the animal world, the competition between individuals belonging to different species for a resource often requires the
cooperation of several individuals in groups. This paper proposes a generalization of the Hawk-Dove Game for an arbitrary
number of agents: the N-person Hawk-Dove Game. In this model, doves exemplify the cooperative behavior without intraspecies
conflict, while hawks represent the aggressive behavior. In the absence of hawks, doves share the resource equally and avoid
conflict, but having hawks around lead to doves escaping without fighting. Conversely, hawks fight for the resource at the cost
of getting injured. Nevertheless, if doves are present in sufficient number to expel the hawks, they can aggregate to protect the
resource, and thus avoid being plundered by hawks. We derive and numerically solve an exact equation for the evolution of the
system in both finite and infinite well-mixed populations, finding the conditions for stable coexistence between both species.
Furthermore, by varying the different parameters, we found a scenario of bifurcations that leads the system from dominating
hawks and coexistence to bi-stability, multiple interior equilibria and dominating doves.
Introduction
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) provides a theoretical framework to model Darwinian competition that has been widely used
to study evolving populations of lifeforms in biology and, particularly, for the study of cooperative behavior in animals1–5.
In this context, most of the research has focused on two-person games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma6, the Stag Hunt7 and
the Hawk-Dove Game (HDG)8, 9, which describe conflicting situations where some individuals profit from selfishness to the
detriment of others. From these games, the Prisoner’s dilemma reproduces the worst possible scenario for cooperation, in
which an agent always gets the highest individual benefit by not cooperating. The Stag Hunt is a coordination game that
describes a conflict between safety and cooperation: while the greatest benefit for both agents is obtained when both cooperate,
cooperation implies a risk, because cooperating against a non cooperative agent provides the lowest benefit. The HDG is an
anti-coordination game with two possible strategies: cooperation or defection. While the best strategy against a cooperator is
defection, the highest cost is paid by defecting against a defector.
The above games or dilemmas have greatly contributed, despite their simplifications, to a better understanding of what
could be plausible mechanisms for the emergence and sustainability of cooperative behavior. However, many real-life situations
involve collective decisions made by a group, rather than by only two individuals. In this sense, Public Goods Game (PGG)
capture situations in which some individuals (free-riders) can benefit from other ones (cooperators) without paying any cost,
that is, without suffering the decrease of fitness associated with the production of the common good10. In the classical PGG, the
contributions of cooperators to a common pool are enhanced and equally shared among cooperators and defectors, regardless
their contribution11.
In addition to the PGG, there is a large set of possible multi-agent situations that can be addressed through other games. In
this regard, the Snowdrift Game (SG) is a model of conflict in which there is a task to be done. The basis underlying the conflict
is that defectors benefit from cooperators without paying a cost for doing the task, but without cooperators the task would
not be accomplished12. When only two individuals are involved, the situation is described by the standard SG. In this case,
both agents are faced with a common task. There are three possible outcomes: i) No one cooperates, and hence the task is not
achieved with the consequent damage to each one. ii) Both individuals cooperate, and both benefit, sharing the work associated
with the task. iii) If only one individual cooperates, both benefit from the task done despite the fact that the cooperator has paid
the entire cost associated to the task2. If the benefit is greater than the cost, the ordering of payoffs coincides with that of the
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HDG. This means that in the case of only two individuals involved, both HDG and SG are equivalent. When more than two
agents are involved, the conflict underlying the Snowdrift problem can be addressed through an N-person generalization of the
standard SG13. The N-person SG considers a sample consisting of N agents and a task to be done. Every agent, regardless
of whether he contributes to the task or not, will receive a fixed benefit if the task is performed by one or more agents within
the sample. The total cost of performing the task is equally shared among those who perform it (the cooperators), while the
defectors benefit without paying any cost14–18. On the other hand, the situation in the Hawk-Dove problem is of a very different
nature compared to that underlying the Snowdrift. In the Hawk-Dove problem there is not a task to be done, but a resource
susceptible to be shared. While in the Snowdrift problem every individual benefits from the task, if accomplished, in the
Hawk-Dove problem only a kind of strategists (cooperators or defectors) benefits from the resource, excluding the opponent
strategists from the distribution8, 9, 19, 20. This different nature materializes when there are more than two individuals involved;
in this general case, the mathematical formulation differs drastically between both situations, which call for a new approach to
deal with the Hawk-Dove problem for many individuals.
Here, we propose a generalization of HDG for N agents, hereafter N-person HDG, with the aim of analyzing how the
dynamics is affected when considering group interactions. In the N-person HDG, two kinds of strategists (hawks and doves)
compete for a resource R. While hawks are willing to fight to get the whole resource, doves wish to share the resource equally,
refusing the resource rather than fighting for it. Accordingly, when a set of individuals face a resource, the hawks fight among
them, paying a cost cH , while doves retreat. Only in the case that there are no hawks competing for the resource, the doves will
share it. The fitness of the individuals is determined by their payoff when getting involved in an N-person HDG. We study
analytically the evolution of cooperative behavior within the framework of the replicator dynamics3, 21, by considering either a
very large or an infinite population of hawks and doves. More concretely, we assume a population of size Z, from which groups
of size N are randomly sampled; let nH and nD denote the numbers of hawks and doves in the sample respectively, N = nH +nD.
For any given group size N, we derive an exact equation for the evolution of the fraction of doves in a well-mixed population,
which can be solved numerically as a function of the rest of the parameters. We first study the infinite size limit Z→ ∞, and
show the existence of a critical value ccv for cH above which cooperation is sustainable. While in the region cH > ccv, hawks
and doves coexist in the stationary state, for cH < ccv the dynamics leads to the extinction of the doves, resulting in a population
of only hawk strategists.
Furthermore, as a refinement of the model, we consider the situation in which the doves aggregate to defend the resource,
not at all cost, but only in the case they are present in sufficient number to expel the hawks, i.e., there is a minimum threshold T
that assures them to succeed. In that case, after expelling the hawks, paying a cost cD for it, doves share the resource without
fighting among themselves. Otherwise, i.e., if the number of doves is below the threshold, they retreat and the hawks fight
among themselves. It is worth noticing that although both hawks and doves can fight, a hawk will fight in any situation (unless
all his opponents flee), while doves only fight against opposite strategists, and provided they are allowed to expel them. This
refinement of the model, hereafter N-person HDG with threshold (HDG-T), captures the stress between gregarious and asocial
behaviors. We show that, depending on the values of T,cD,cH , the dynamics drives the system towards either one of the
absorbing mono-strategic states (all hawks or all doves), or towards an interior equilibrium in which both strategies coexist.
Subsequently, we study the dynamics in finite populations, finding results compatible with those obtained for the infinite size
limit Z→ ∞.
Results
Preliminary concepts
As mentioned earlier, the standard HDG is a two-player-two-strategies game that captures a conflict of interests in which the
most advantageous strategy is the opposite to that of the opponent. There are two possible strategies, namely, hawkish behavior
(H), that represents fighting, and dove behavior (D), that represents sharing. When faced with a common resource R, two doves
equally share the resource obtaining each one R/2, while two hawks fight for it, paying a cost c that represents the damage
caused by the fight, and therefore obtaining each one (R−c)/2. If a hawk meets a dove, the hawk obtains the whole resource R,
while the dove retreats and gets nothing. The game can be expressed by means of its payoff matrix, where rows represent focal
player’s strategies, columns represent opponent’s strategies, and the corresponding matrix element is the payoff received by the
focal player:
strategy H D
H (R− c)/2 R
D 0 R/2
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N-person HDG
The model we present here constitutes a generalization of the two-person HDG to an N-person game. Assume a sample of
size N ≥ 2 with two kinds of strategists, the aggressive ones − like the hawks−, and the cooperators − the doves. Let R be a
resource such as food or water. As pointed out before, when the population is made up by all doves, they share the resource
equally avoiding conflict. If doves meet hawks, all doves escape without fighting, while the remaining hawks fight for the
resource paying a given cost. Their respective payoffs are:
Hawks’ Payoff:
PH =
R− (nh−1)cH
nh
nH > 0 (1)
Doves’ payoff:
PD =
{
R
N nH = 0
0 nH > 0
(2)
where nH and nD represent the numbers of hawks and doves in the sample, respectively, and cH the cost of injury. Thus,
(nH −1)cH represents the total injury suffered by all the hawks. It should be noted that doves only get payoffs when there are
no hawks in the sample. For N = 2, the model recovers the standard two-person HDG. In order to study the effect of cost and
sample size and composition, R is conventionally assumed to be 1.
Consider a very large population Z→∞, composed of a fraction x of doves, the rest (1−x) being hawks. Social interactions
take place in sample groups of size N, which are randomly selected from the whole population. The average fitness of hawks
fH(x) and doves fD(x) is determined according to a binomial sampling, as shown in the methods section. We study the
population dynamics in terms of the replicator equation3, according to which the time evolution of x is given by:
x˙ = x( fD(x)−〈 f (x)〉) , (3)
where x˙ represents the gradient of selection and 〈 f (x)〉 stands for the average fitness of the whole population.
Figure 1(a) shows the gradient of selection x˙ as a function of the density x of doves, for different values of cH and a simple
size of N = 5. As shown, for a small cost (cH = 0.1), the gradient of selection is always negative and doves fail to survive
regardless of any initial condition. Nevertheless, as the internal conflict among the hawks grows, and with it its associated cost
cH , there appears a critical value, beyond which an internal equilibrium point indicates the coexistence of doves and hawks in
the steady state. Furthermore, setting fD(x) = fH(x) and x = 0, the minimum value of cH for stable equilibrium to survive is
ccv = R/(N−1), being ccv the critical value. Figure 1(b) shows the fraction of doves x∗ in the equilibrium as a function of the
cost cH , for different sample sizes N. As shown, the equilibrium fraction of doves increases with increasing cost of hawks
and increasing sample size. The latter follows from the fact that the greater the sample size, the greater the number of hawks
involved in the fight. In general, a higher competition of hawks (either due to an increase in sample size or to an increase in
hawks’ cost) entails a decrease in their average fitness, and thus the equilibrium frequency of doves increases. As cH > ccv
implies x∗ > 0, it follows that ccv determines the value for the transition from a mono-species state to coexistence.
At this point, let us assume a finite population of size Z, composed by k doves and (Z− k) hawks. As in the case of
infinite populations, interactions take place in sample groups of size N, but in this case the mean fitness of hawks and doves is
determined in accordance with a multivariate hypergeometric sampling, see the section Methods. Regarding the dynamics, we
assume a stochastic birth-death process driven by a pairwise Fermi-like rule22. According to this rule, at each time step, two
individuals (u,v) are randomly selected. The probability that a descendant of v replaces u is given by an increasing function of
the payoff difference:
p =
1
1+ exp[−w( fu− fv)] , (4)
where the parameter w controls the intensity of selection. Low w represents high noise and, correspondingly, weak selection
pressure.
Figure 2(a) shows the gradient of selection G(k) describing the evolutionary dynamics of N-person HDG in finite populations
as a function of the fraction of doves k/Z, for different population sizes Z and costs cH and a sample size of N = 5. It should
be noted that, for finite populations, the fraction of doves k/Z is not a continuous variable, but a discrete one. It is shown
that, as in the previously discussed case of infinite populations, for a small cost cH the gradient of selection is always negative
G(k)< 0, and therefore doves become extinct, regardless of their initial fraction in the population. For higher cost values cH ,
there exists a unique internal root k∗ making G(k) = 0. Therefore, a stable equilibrium arises with increasing cH and doves
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Figure 1. Gradient of selection and equilibria of the N-person Hawk-Dove Game in infinite populations. (a) Gradient
of selection x˙ in the N-person HDG as a function of the frequency x of doves, for a sample size of N = 5. Different colors stand
for different costs cH = 0.1,0.5,0.9. Circles represent the interior attractors indicating the coexistence of hawks and doves in
the steady state. (b) Equilibria of the N-person Hawk-Dove Game in infinite populations for different values of cost cH . x∗
represents the equilibrium fraction of doves in the population. There is a critical value ccv = 1/(N−1) for the cost cH beyond
which hawks and doves coexist. The resource is taken as unity R = 1. See the main text for further details.
are promoted. In addition, both the gradient of selection G(k) and the internal stable equilibrium k∗ increase slightly as the
group size Z increases, which implies that large populations facilitate the advantage of doves. Fig. 2(b) depicts the equilibrium
fractions of doves as a function of the cost cH , for different sample sizes N and a fixed population size Z = 100. Note that these
results are compatible with those obtained for finite populations. Thus, when increasing cH , the regime in which the hawks
dominate changes to a regime in which both species coexist. Moreover, increasing the sample size enhances the fitness of doves
and, consequently, less hawks’ cost cH is required for the existence of doves.
N-person HDG-T
In the above described N-person HDG, doves are assumed to be non-aggressive. As a refinement of the model, now we assume
that doves can aggregate to protect the resource and thus avoid being plundered by hawks. This situation is very common
in nature, where animals such as buffaloes aggregate to fight against predators. In this revised model, N-person HDG-T, we
assume a threshold T . If the fraction of doves exceeds or equals the threshold (nD/N ≥ T ), the doves expel the hawks, paying a
cost cD for it, and then share the resource equally without fighting among themselves. Otherwise, if the number of doves is
below the threshold (ND/N < T ), doves retreat and hawks fight among themselves for the resource. The respective payoffs of
doves and hawks in the N-person HDG-T are:
Hawks’ payoff:
PH =
{
0 nD/N ≥ T
R−(nH−1)cH
nH
nD/N < T
(5)
Doves’ payoff:
PD =
{
R−nH cD
nD
nD/N ≥ T
0 nD/N < T
(6)
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Figure 2. Gradient of selection and equilibria of the N-person Hawk-Dove Game in finite populations. (a) Gradient of
selection G(k) in the N-person HDG as a function of the discrete fraction k/Z of doves, for different population sizes Z and a
sample size of N = 5. Different shapes of symbols represent different population sizes Z = 10,20,100, while solid (resp.,
empty) symbols represent a cost of cH = 0.1 (resp., 0.5). (b) Equilibria of the N-person Hawk-Dove Game in finite populations
for different values of cost cH , and a population size of Z = 100. Symbols denote the required values of cH for which there
exists an equilibrium at k/Z. Note that, for finite populations, k/Z takes discrete values. Different symbols represent different
sample sizes N. Other parameters are R = 1, w = 1.
where nH (resp., nD) stands for the number of hawks (resp., doves) in the sample of size N, cD for the cost of doves to protect
the resource from being plundering by hawks, and cH for the cost of injury within hawks. Notice, once again, the different
nature of both costs: while cH refers to intra-specific competition, cD refers to an interspecific (intergroup) conflict cost. For
T = 1 the previous N-person HDG model is recovered.
As in the previous model, for the case of a very large population (Z→ ∞) the population dynamics is studied according to
the replicator equation. Figure 3 represents the frequency of doves in the equilibrium x∗ for different thresholds and costs in
the limit of an infinite population. Upper panels show how the intra-specific conflict cost of hawks cH impacts the evolution
of doves for different thresholds T = 0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8 and for different fixed values of doves’ cost cD. As shown in panel (a),
when the threshold is small (T = 0.2), indicating that doves are more resourceful in intergroup competition, a slight cost of
doves (cD = 0.2) drives the population to evolve into a full-dove state and no interior equilibrium exists. When cD is increased,
an unstable equilibrium emerges and divides the system into two basins of attraction regardless of cH . Both full-dove state
and full-hawk state can be reached from different initial conditions: for an initial frequency of doves x0 > x∗, the hawks
vanish ( fD > fH ), but for x0 < x∗, the doves are the ones that vanish ( fD < fH ), indicating that both absorbing states are stable
equilibria and the proposed game is transformed into a coordination game. Panels (b-d) show the behavior for greater thresholds
T > 0.2. In these cases, for a small cH , an interior unstable equilibrium appears, whose value decreases for larger cH , indicating
that increasing cH enlarges the basin of attraction of the full-dove steady state. With further increasing cH , multiple interior
equilibria can occur and a new stable equilibrium emerges. Finally, for even higher values of cH , both unstable and stable
equilibria converge to a saddle-node bifurcation beyond which the dynamics always leads to a full-dove state.
Bottom panels of Fig. 3 show the effects of the intergroup conflict cost of doves cD. When the threshold is small (T = 0.2),
as shown in panel (e), x∗ = 1 is the only steady state for low values of cD, which means that the dynamics always leads to a
full-dove state regardless of the initial condition. With the increase of cD, an unstable equilibrium appears and the dynamics
changes from dominating doves to bi-stability. However, for cH = 0.8, a saddle-node bifurcation emerges as cD is increased,
but the stable equilibrium only exists for a very small range of values of cD, resulting in a transcritical bifurcation that leads
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to bi-stability. Panels (f-h) show the behavior for greater thresholds T > 0.2. In these cases, a small cH leads to an interior
unstable equilibrium, while a large cH results in the domination of doves. Yet for a moderate cH , multiple interior equilibria
including an unstable equilibrium and a stable equilibrium drive the system to either the domination of doves or the coexistence
of both species under different initial conditions.
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Figure 3. Equilibria of the N-person Hawk-Dove Game with threshold in infinite populations. Fraction of doves x∗ at
the equilibrium for a sample size of N = 5. Solid (resp., dashed) line corresponds to stable (resp., unstable) equilibrium. Top
panels represent x∗ as a function of the hawks’ cost cH . Different color lines stand for different doves’ costs: red, blue and gray
lines represent cD = 0.2,0.5,0.8 respectively. The bottom panels represent x∗ as a function of the doves’ cost cD. Different
color lines stand for different hawks’ costs: red, blue and gray lines represent cH = 0.2,0.5,0.8 respectively. Shaded areas
denote a negative gradient of selection. (a,e), (b,f), (c,g) and (d,h) panels correspond to thresholds T = 0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8
respectively. The resource is taken as unity R = 1. See the main text for further details.
Figure 4 shows a natural classification of the dynamics of N-person HDG-T that depicts three basic phase regimes. The
condition that favors hawks is met when PD(N)−PH(N−1)< 0, indicating that a single hawk in a group of N−1 doves is
better off than a dove in a full-dove group. For T = 1 this condition becomes PD(N)−PH(N−1) = R/N−R < 0, which is
always met, and hawks do not vanish (shown in Fig. 1(b)). Besides, the condition for a successful invasion of doves is obtained
when a single dove in a group of N−1 hawks has a higher income than a full hawkish group, namely, PD(1)−PH(0)> 0. For
T = 1/N this condition becomes cH −NcD+R > 0, see the red line in Fig. 4(a). Below this line, multiple interior equilibria
are found −though in a narrow region−, as well as a full-dove state. However, for T ≥ 2/N, one gets that cH > R/(N−1)
from the relation PD(1)−PH(0)> 0, which provides a condition for the emergence of stable equilibria. Results in Figure 4
highlight the possible transitions between three different phases as a function of the costs and the threshold T . Consequently,
both increasing cH and decreasing cD facilitate the fixation of the doves in the population.
Furthermore, T also has critical effects on the evolutionary dynamics. For instance, by increasing it, one can find regions
where dominating doves give rise to bi-stability, and other changes such as from multiple interior equilibria to dominating doves,
or from bi-stability to multiple interior equilibria and even to dominating doves. Additionally, increasing T suppresses doves
even for a small cH , while there is an optimal T that facilitates doves. For cH > R/(N−1), increasing T not only strengthens
the intergroup competitiveness of doves − there are less hawks to fight with, thus, the cost is smaller− when nD/N ≥ T , but
also weakens the in-group competitiveness of hawks, since the decrease in the maximum number of hawks to win over doves
results in less in-group injury when nH/N > T . As a consequence, an optimal T is found to promote doves. Particularly, for
cH ≤ R/(N−1), the payoff of a single dove in a group of N−1 hawks is lower than the payoff of a hawk in a full hawkish
group since PD(1)−PH(0)> 0, and therefore doves are suppressed. On the other hand, a small cH enhances the competitiveness
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of hawks in intergroup conflict. As a consequence, increasing T reduces the in-group conflict of hawks and finally favors
hawks. Regarding the effects of sample size, regardless of costs, increasing N suppresses doves for T = 1/N, since the basin of
attraction of the hawkish state increases, whereas doves are favored for T = 1 since stable equilibrium increases. This behavior
is mainly attributed to the impact of sample size on in-group competition and resource allocation, benefiting the incomes of
victorious agents from the reduced reduction.
As for finite populations, Fig. 5 shows the equilibrium fraction of doves k∗/Z as a function of the costs cH and cD, for
different sample sizes N and a fixed population size Z = 100. The interior roots of G(k), varying with different costs and
thresholds, are presented when the roots exist. These results are very similar to those corresponding to infinite populations shown
in Fig. 3. Particularly, since successful invasions can be directly obtained from PD(k) and PH(k), which are independent of
binomial or hypergeometric samplings, the phase diagrams are extremely similar to those corresponding to infinite populations
shown in Fig. 4. We have also explored the effects of threshold and sample size, which in finite populations are not qualitatively
different from those reported before for infinite populations. Moreover, by exploring the stationary distribution of doves, it is
also found that both increasing cH and decreasing cD promote doves. Finally, although the equilibrium points show a small
dependence on the population size Z, it vanishes as Z grows, finding that for sufficiently high values of Z the dynamics is
independent of the population size, which means that for large enough populations (Z/N ≥ 100) the infinite population limit is
a fair approximation that captures the dynamics of the system.
Discussion
In summary, this work proposes a general framework of multi-player Hawk-Dove game that generalizes the traditional
symmetric two-person Hawk-Dove game. Two different kinds of species, denoted as hawks and doves respectively, represent
the competition to survive of hawkish and cooperative behaviors through group interactions. The hawkish behavior, a more
competitive trait, wins intergroup conflict, but also bears the cost associated with intra-group conflict, whereas the cooperative
behavior, overcoming intra-species conflict, may lose in interspecies conflict unless the fraction of doves exceeds a threshold T .
By implementing the proposed model in well-mixed infinite and finite populations, we found that increasing the intra-group
competition cost of hawks, as well as decreasing the intergroup competition cost of doves, promotes the evolution of doves.
Furthermore, the threshold plays a key role in the model. As T decreases from T = 1, the phase regimes changes from
dominating hawks and stability to bi-stability, multiple interior equilibria and dominating doves. Specially, if the intra-group
competition cost of hawks is greater than R/(N−1), an optimal threshold is found to optimize doves, otherwise increasing
threshold suppresses them.
Although two-person Hawk-Dove Games can mathematically be regarded as a Snowdrift Game, this equivalence breaks
down when generalizing it to N persons. An N-person Snowdrift Game characterizes real-world situations in which a task needs
to be done by cooperating, with the consequent benefit for the group, whereas the proposed model describes the competition
for a resource between two species. The N-person Hawk-Dove here presented thus conceptualizes the dilemma that being an
aggressive type can reward from interspecies competition but also incurs a high cost in terms of intra-species conflict, while
cooperators aggregate and share the resource. We also hypothesize that, if the present model were to be applied to a real context
in nature, the threshold needed for successful preservation of the doves type would be very high. Indeed, a high threshold is
more realistic than the assumptions on which either doves obtain nothing unless no hawks are in the group or a low threshold
that implies a fiercer intra-species conflict. Furthermore, group interactions can not be regarded as a set of independent pairwise
encounters. Finally, we mention that in previous studies of a two-person Hawk-Dove Game, both an heterogeneous topology
and different update rules have been proven to have an impact on cooperation19, 20. It would thus be of further interest to
explore how such factors change our findings for N-person hawk-dove games, and therefore gain more insights into our current
understanding of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas.
Methods
Evolutionary dynamics in infinite populations
Consider a very large well-mixed population Z→ ∞, composed of a fraction x of doves and a fraction (1−x) of hawks. Sample
groups of size N are randomly selected from the population. Following a binomial sampling23, the mean fitness of hawks in the
population is given by:
fH(x) =
N−1
∑
i=0
(N−1
i
)
xi(1− x)N−1−iPH(i) , (7)
whereas the average fitness of doves is:
fD(x) =
N−1
∑
i=0
(N−1
i
)
xi(1− x)N−1−iPD(i+1) . (8)
7/12
The time evolution of x is given by the replicator equation3:
x˙ = x( fD(x)−〈 f (x)〉) = x( fD(x)− (x fD(x)+(1− x) fH(x))) = x(1− x)( fD(x)− fH(x)) , (9)
where 〈 f (x)〉 represents the average fitness of the whole population. From this equation, it follows that the equilibria satisfy:
fD(x∗)− fH(x∗) = 0 . (10)
As an illustrative example, let us consider the case T = N, corresponding to the N-person HDG. According to equations
(1,7), the mean fitness of hawks is given by:
fH(x) =
(R+ cH)(1− xN)
N(1− x) − cH , (11)
while from equations (2,8) it follows that the mean fitness of doves is:
fD(x) =
RxN−1
N
. (12)
Hence, we get:
fD(x)− fH(x) = cHx
N +RxN−1−NcHx+NcH −R− cH
N(1− x) , (13)
and the replicator equation (9) can be written as:
x˙ =
x
N
(cHxN +RxN−1−NcHx+NcH −R− cH) (14)
Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations
In this subsection, we address the evolutionary dynamics of N-person HDG in finite populations of size Z. Unlike the case of
infinite populations, where sampling followed a binomial distribution, the groups in finite populations are given by a multivariate
hypergeometric sampling24, 25. Let k be the number of doves in the total population. Accordingly, the number of hawks will be
Z− k. Now, the fraction of doves (k/Z) is not a continuous variable, but a discrete one. The average fitness of hawks is thus
given by:
fH(k) =
N−1
∑
i=0
(k
i
)(Z−k−1
N−i−1
)(Z−1
N−1
) PH(i) , (15)
whereas the average fitness of doves is:
fD(k) =
N−1
∑
i=0
(k−1
i
)( Z−k
N−i−1
)(Z−1
N−1
) PD(i+1) . (16)
Assuming the Fermi-like rule22, at each elementary time step two individuals are chosen at random from the population. If
they are of different species, then the probabilities that a dove replaces a hawk, and the opposite scenario, are given, respectively,
as
pD→H =
1
1+ exp[−w( fD(k)− fH(k))] , (17)
and
pH→D =
1
1+ exp[−w( fH(k)− fD(k))] . (18)
Consequently, the probabilities that the finite population increases (T+) or decreases (T−) by one dove are26:
T±(k) =
k
Z
Z− k
Z
1
1+ e∓w( fD(k)− fH (k))
, (19)
and therefore, the gradient of selection in finite populations is given by:
G(k) = T+(k)−T−(k) = k
Z
Z− k
Z
tanh(
w
2
( fD(k)− fH(k))) (20)
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Figure 4. Phase diagrams for the N-person Hawk-Dove Game with threshold. Diagrams show the different regimes in
the N-person HDG-T for a sample size of N = 5 and an infinite population. Different panels correspond to different thresholds
T = 0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8 respectively. Within the bi-stability regime both full-dove state and full-hawk state can be reached from
different initial conditions, while the bi-stability+stability regime corresponds to coexistence state together with full-dove state.
In the doves regime the dynamics always leads to a full-dove state. The resource is taken R = 1.
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Figure 5. Equilibria of the N-person Hawk-Dove Game with threshold in finite populations. Fraction of doves k∗/Z in
the equilibrium as a function of the hawks’ cost cH (top) and doves’ cost cD (bottom), for a sample size of N = 5 in a finite
population of size Z = 100. Solid (dashed) points represent stable (bistable) points, whereas dashed lines mark the regions
beyond which fD > fH and below which fD < fH . In top panels, different colored symbols represent different doves’ costs:
red, blue and gray lines correspond to cD = 0.2,0.5,0.8, respectively. In the bottom panels, red, blue and gray symbols
represent hawks’ costs cH = 0.2,0.5,0.8, respectively. Other parameters are R = 1, w = 1.
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